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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, a body politic, and MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corpo~
ration,
I
Defendants. )

Case No.
7884

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties herein may be designated as follows : defendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "the Commission", the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company as "the Company", and Ogden City as "the City."
Emphasis has been supplied.
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There is no substantial question of fact in this case.
We believe that the issues of law may be determined
by the consideration of certain simple basic propositions.
An understanding of such issues requires that attention be
fixed upon the relevant facts and that other matters be set
to one side. Because we believe that the statement of the
City does not focus attention upon the essential facts, the
Company presents the following statement:
The operations of the Company necessarily involve
revenue and expense. We have here under consideration a
particular class of company expense, namely expenditures
which it makes and must make to cities and towns in this
State in the discharge of franchise, excise and occupational
taxes and similar impositions and the so-called free service
which the Company has agreed to render to certain municipalities (R. 109). These impositions and so-called free service will be referred to collectively in this brief as "munici- '
pal levies".

1

Included within and typical of such municipal leviesis the money which the Company must pay to the City and .
the free service which it has agreed to render to the City
under a franchise and agreement of 1941. The franchcise;
(R. 21) provides in part that
"Section 4. In lieu of all license, franchise, oc-:i
cupation and other similar taxes, the Company shall.,
pay to the City of Ogden upon passage, approval and'
acceptance of this ordinance, an amount equal to onett
per cent ( 1%) of the total exchange revenue derived·:;
from telephones located within the Ogden city lim·
its."
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3
The agreement (R. 22) provides in part that

/

"Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company will provide your city (Ogden City) with the
following:
"1. Twenty-four individual Line Flat
Rate Business telephones, or the equivalent, until the population reaches 50,000, and one individual Line Flat Rate Business telephone, or the
equivalent, for each additional 5,000 population
over 50,000 up to a maximum of 100,000 population.
"2. We will also furnish the city police
department with toll service not to exceed
$600.00 per year."

The annual value of said free service for the year 1952 is
estimated by the Company to be equal to .44 per cent of the
Company's gross local exchange revenue in Ogden for that
year, making the annual franchise tax and the value of free
service equal to 1.44 per cent of the Company's 1952 estimated gross exchange revenues received from the Ogden
City customers of the Company (R. 18-125). ,
The relationship arising in connection with the imposition of municipal levies and the payment of the same is
a relationship, however, entirely between the Company on
the one hand and the cities and towns throughout the State,
including Ogden City, on the other hand. The telephone
~
customers are not a party to the imposition of these munici' pal levies, and the duty of the payment of the same rests
~entirely upon the Company (R. 161-62, 181).
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While this case relates to the matter of this particular
kind of company expense, neither the proposed tariff of
the Company nor the order of the Commission here under
review disturbs or impairs the relationship between the
Company and Ogden City or any other city or town imposing upon the C9mpany the obligation to discharge municipal
levies (R. 161-64). This case is not concerned with the
imposition of municipal levies nor with the obligation or
duty of the Company to discharge such levies. This case is,
however, directly and necessarily concerned with the matter
of the source of certain company revenue; and the proposed
company tariff and the order of the Commission here under
review undertake to provide and prescribe the sources of
company revenue to pay these levies. Thus the relationship to which this case applies is the relationship between
the Company on the one hand and its customers on the
other hand (R. 161-64). In the apparent failure of the City
to perceive these facts lies its fundamental misconception
of the nature of the proposal of the Company and the order
of the Commission.
The only source of revenue which the Company has is
from its customers (R. 128). The money which the Company receives from its customers for intrastate telephone
service is derived from rates which the Company publishes
and files with the Commission (R. 161-64). The determination of these rates and charges is one of the important functions and duties of the Commission and is a subject of its
jurisdiction (R. 33).
In the past the Company has obtained the money with
which to pay its expenses, including municipal levies, from

1

i
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its customers on a state-wide basis (R. 110). The mechanics of fixing exchange rates has been to divide the telephone
exchanges of the State into groupings based upon the number of customers within an exchange and to fix rates
uniform \\ithin each group of exchanges throughout the
State (R. 129). In making such rates the Commission has
fixed the same at levels sufficient to provide overall revenue
to the Company high enough to pay all of the Company's
expense and in addition thereto to provide a return on the
·- Company's properties at the percentage fixed by the Com~ mission (R. 119). Thus these state-wide rates provided
-· moneys with which to pay all of the expenses of the Com- pany, including the municipal levies here involved. The
. . effect of these rates was therefore such that the telephone
bill of a customer living within a city or town which im~: posed no municipal levy included a portion of the amount
.-. required by the Company to be paid to other cities and towns
;.:::; levying such impositions (R. 110).
Under the tariff involved in this case, the Company
proposes that it will no longer obtain the money with which
:::· to pay municipal levies from all of its customers, but rather
_...- that it will, so far as practicable, derive money for such
:::·::.purpose from its customers on a prorata basis within the
::"- respective communities where the municipal levies are im::_;;. posed (R. 110) .
./

-:;.--

When these municipal levies were first imposed ·upon

~;::::the Company they were so nominal that the amounts in-

volved would have had no appreciable effect upon the rates
~~paid by the users of telephone service throughout the State.

~'~
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No substantial change occurred in the extent of these taxes
for many years. The Company now finds that these levies
are rising sharply and today present a serious tax problem
(R. 117).
At the time of hearing before the Commission, in fortysix cities and towns within the State municipal levies were
imposed on the Company, estimated by it for the year 1952
to be equal to percentages of its gross exchange revenue
within such municipalities ranging from .39 per cent in
Midvale to 7.28 per cent in Scofield (R. 18-Exhibit 2).
In thirty other cities and towns the amount of municipal
levies in the same period was so small that when related ·
to the lowest priced service within the exchange would not
produce a charge of one cent per month (R. 19-Exhibit
2). In ninety-four cities, towns and communities no municipal levies were then imposed (R. 20-Exhibit. 2). So-called
free service is rendered by the Company to each county in
the State where it has exchanges except Washington. This
county free service is, however, spread quite uniformly
throughout the State; it represents a small item of overall
expense, and the Company does not regard the practice of
including this expense in its state-wide rates as being discriminatory. The Company does not propose that the tariff
here involved shall have any effect upon the so-called free
service currently being rendered to counties (R. 121).
With respect to municipal levies, however, the Company has reason to believe that the present disparity in the
rate of imposition in the respective cities will continue and
may become greater as time goes on (R. 117). The Com-
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pany has no means of anticipating what city may next call
upon it for the payment of such levy or what the rate may
be (R. 116).

t

1
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The Company therefore reached the decision that its
practice of including municipal levies in its state-wide rates
was unjust and discriminatory and that the removal of
such discriminatory practice required the adoption of its
proposed tariff, whereby money for the payment of such
levies would be collected, so far as practicable, where imposed (R. 116-117). The Commission found that the practice of including the expenses of municipal levies in statewide rates was unjust and discriminatory (R. 28-29) and
ordered the Company to file a tariff for the recovery prorata of municipal levies within the cities and towns where
imposed (R. 35) .
There is no doubt or uncertainty as to the nature of the
tariff which the Commission's order authorized the Company to file. It is a tariff dealing simply and exclusively
with revenue. This is clear from the testimony of Mr.
Sawyer in answer to questions from Mr. Thain of the Com-·
mission's staff (R. 161) as follows:
"Q. Now, what do you propose to do with your
municipal taxes if the proposal you now make is approved by the Commission?
"A. Well, this particular tax, as I mentioned,
is imposed upon the Telephone Company, and as such
is an expense against our operations the same as
other general operating expenses. So, we propose
to add this additional expense to our regular tariff '
rates in those towns where this particular expense is
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imposed. In other words; it amounts to varying our
schedules to the extent of this expense in these towns.
"Q. In other words, all of the tax which you will
bill will in effect become a revenue? That is, it will
be credited to the revenue account of the company?

"A.

Yes.

"Q. And the tax payments will show up as a
tax expense in the tax accounts of the company?

"A. Yes ; that is the way it is accounted for
now. In picking up the revenue for this expense in
connection with our present state-wide schedules it
is a revenue, and there will be no change in the accounting for that particular revenue over the way
we do it now."
And again at R. 162 as follows:
"Q. What you mean to say is that in the past
any municipal taxes have been included as part of
your overall expenses in determining the setting of
rates?

"A.

That's right.

"Q. Which this Commission has authorized you
to charge?

"A.

That's right.

"Q. And accordingly, anything that was in
there then, theoretically at least, is in your revenue
now?

"A.

That's right.
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"Q. But insofar as practical in the future you
are going to kind of isolate it and add it on to your
bill here?

"A. Yes; we will determine what that expense
, is in each town and adjust the rates in that particular
town to take care of that expense. That takes it out
of your state-wide rate schedules then."
The Company did not, however, propose at this time
to disturb its state-wide rate schedules previously authorized (R. 118-119). The operation of the tariff in question
in connection with existing state-wide rate schedules would
therefore improve slightly (about .21 per cent) the earnings of the Company. This improvement would raise the
Company's earnings on the rate base heretofore allowed
by the Commission from approximately 5.26 per cent to ~.4 7
per cent, which is below the level heretofore found by the
Commission to be reasonable (R. 118-119, 30). And once
the change proposed by the tariff were made, the Company
thereafter would not have any improvement in or lessening
of its earnings by reason of the recovery locally of moneys
with which to pay municipal levies because subsequent
billing would be automatically adjusted to provide for any
increase or reduction in these municipal levies (R. 30).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
I.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS THAT THE INCLUSION OF
MUNICIPAL LEVIES IN THE COMPANY'S
STATE-WIDE RATES IS AN UNJUST AND
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DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE AND THAT
SUCH PRACTICE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
BY THE COMPANY'S COLLECTING, SO FAR
AS PRACTICABLE, MONEYS TO PAY SUCH
LEVIES FROM ITS CUSTOMERS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES WHERE SUCH LEVIES ARE
IMPOSED.
II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CITY'S CONTENTION THAT MONEYS TO
DISCHARGE ITS MUNICIPAL LEVY SHOULD
BE PAID BY THE STATE-WIDE CUSTOMERS
OF THE COMPANY.
III.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION AND VALID. IT
NEITHER IMP AIRS ANY FRANCHISE OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY TO THE CITY
NOR IN ANY MANNER RELEASES OR EXTINGUISHES ANY INDEBTEDNESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY TO
THE CITY.
IV.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION FIXES
RATES; IT IMPOSES NO TAX OF ANY KIND
ON THE TELEPHONE CUSTOMER.
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ARGUMENT
We perceive but one issue in this case, namely
whether just and nondiscriminatory practices require that
the Company construct its rates so that, so far as practicable, money to discharge municipal levies shall be collected
from its customers within the municipalities where such
levies are imposed rather than from its customers on a
state-wide basis. The Company will, however, undertake to
deal with each of the Points relied upon by the plaintiff in
its brief and will do so in the following argument under
defendant's Points herein designated.

I.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS THAT THE INCLUSION OF
MUNICIPAL LEVIES IN THE COMPANY'S
STATE-WIDE RATES IS AN UNJUST AND
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE AND THAT
SUCH PRACTICE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
BY THE COMPANY'S COLLECTING, SO FAR
AS PRACTICABLE, MONEYS TO PAY SUCH
LEVIES FROM ITS CUSTOMERS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES WHERE SUCH LEVIES ARE
IMPOSED.
Under this point the Company will deal witp. the arguments advanced by plaintiff under its Points numbered 1,
2 and 3.
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At the outset of its argument, the City, under its Point
1, appears to urge that the order of the Commission here
under review is unlawful in that the Commission, by some
step taken in the hearing before it, unlawfully cast the
burden of proof on the City. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 105 Utah 230, 142 P. 2d 873, Rehearing denied 105
Utah 266, 145 P. 2d 790, is cited as an authority in point.
That was a discrimination case initiated by the Commission, involving two rate schedules, namely, the intrastate
toll rates of the Mountain States Company and the interstate joint toll rates of the Mountain States Company and
the American Company and other associated Bell companies At the hearing the Commission showed the differential
in charges prevailing for like mileage under the two rates.
The court held that such showing made out a prima facie
case of discrimination and that the burden was then on the
Mountain States Company to justify the differentials. We
are unable to perceive how that decision bears upon the
problem here under consideration. In the case at bar the
Company must produce evidence upon which the Commission may find that the practice of recovery from its customers through state-wide rates of money with which to pay
municipal levies is unjust and discriminatory. Actually, as
the record will show, the Company assumed the burden and
proved its case. If the City intends to complain of some
informality in the procedure of the Commission, the answer
to any such contention is found in Section 76-6-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, which provides that
'
"All hearings, investigations and proceedings
shall be governed by this chapter and by rules of
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practice and procedure to be adopted by the public
utilities commission; in the conduct thereof the tech~
nical rules of evidence need not be applied. No informality in any hearing, investigation or proceedings, or in the manner of taking testimony, shall invalidate any order, decision rule or regulation made,
approved or confirmed by the commission."
- and in Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah et
al., 67 Utah 222, 247 Pac. 284, where, at page 238 of the
Utah Report, the Court said :
"There is also some complaint that the order of
the commission was irregular. If that were so, however, in view of the statute (section 4820, supra) it
would not invalidate the order of the commission
that is complained of here."
The City next contends that there is no evidence to
-::. support the findings of the Commission that unjust dis:. crimination exists in the practice of the Company of collect::::- ing money with which to pay municipal levies from its
_-·- customers on a state-wide basis. Defendants in nowise
_':: concede this contention of the City for there is, we believe,
in Exhibit 2 and in the testimony of the witness Sawyer
=~- ample evidence to support the Commission's findings.
A determination of the question of the sufficiency of
- ; the evidence to support the Commission's findings requires
-_- -at the outset a brief consideration of the controlling stat~; utes and decisions of this Court. The controlling statute is,
~ we believe, Section 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
:···which provides in part that

"* * * * No new or additional evidence
may be introduced in the supreme court, but the
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cause shall be heard on the record of the commission
as certified by it. The review shall not be extended
further than to determine whether the commission
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under.
review violates any right of the petitioner under
the constitution of the United States or of the state
of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall
not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and discrimination. * * *"
No good purpose could be' served by
cases which have construed this statute,
by this court in Union Pacific R. Co. et al.
Commission et al., 103 Utah 459, 135 P.
462 of the Ut.ah Report,

citing the many
for, as observed
v. Public Service
2d 915, at page

"The rule is so well established as to require no
citation of authority that the reviewing power of
the court is confined to the questions as to whether
the commission regularly pursued its authority,
whether its findings are justified by the evidence,
and whether its orders contravene any right under
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Utah."
There are, however, two cases from this Court dealing
with the scope of review, which we believe are particularly helpful. These are the St. John ·Station Case,
Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. 2d 358, and the later case.
of Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com-~

mission et al., 81 Utah 286, 17 P. 2d 287.

r
i
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In the St. John Case the court, at page 472 of the Utah
Report said :
"* * * What we are really asked to review,
therefore, is the question of the judgment of the
commission as applied to the evidence. But we cannot like can the Supreme Court of New Mexico, substitute our judgment for the judgment of the commission. We must determine whether any reasonable mind could have come to the same judgment as
the commission on the evidence controlled by the
principles of law heretofore discussed. If there is
any evidence upon which any reasonably judging
mind could come to the same conclusion that the
commission came to, then we must affirm the decision. * * *"
In the later case, at page 291 of the Utah Report, the
court said:
"In the St. John Station Case we considered at
length the scope of the inquiry which this court could
entertain in a case of certiorari from the commission
under section 4834 (now Sec. 76-6-16, supra). We
held that we had no authority to determine from our
own judgment whether, under the evidence, the agency should be discontinued, and thus put ourselves in
the place of the commission, but we must determine
whether any reasonable mind could come to the same
judgment as the commission came to on the.evidence
controlled by the principles of law discussed in that
opinion. If there is any evidence upon which ·any
reasonable judging mind could come to the same
conclusion that the commission came to, it would be
our duty to affirm the decision of the commission.
* * *"
So in the case at bar, the review extends to a consider•"Ltion of the judgment of the commission as applied to the
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evidence and the inquiry will be whether there is any evidence upon which any reasonably judging mind could come
to the same conclusion that the commission came to. What
then, is the record before us?
There is no essential dispute of facts. The facts were
presented by the oral and documentary evidence of the
witness Sawyer. Neither the City nor any party appearing
in opposition introduced any evidence.
The Company, in meeting the problem presented by
these municipal levies, might have (a) done nothing, (b)
collected locally from its customers only amounts necessary
to pay those levies imposed since its last general rate case,
or (c) collected locally from its customers, so far as practicable, all moneys necessary to pay municipal levies. It discarded (a) because it believed that the time had come when
circumstances necessitated a change in the practices previously employed. It discarded (b) because it considered that
if it were correct in its basic premise of the discrimination
in its present practice, simple justice required that the
practice be completely removed and not removed only as to
some customers and retained as to others (R. 176-77). The
Company therefore determined to pursue course (c).
The facts are that for many years municipal levies
were so nominal that they could have made no appreciable
difference in rate schedules one way or another. In recent
years they have been rising sharply in certain cities and
towns. They now constitute a substantial item of company
expense. They are fixed by a percentage levy of the gross :
receipts of the exchange revenue of the Company in the l'
i
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particular city or town. The Company has no real control
over the rate of levy or where these levies may next be
imposed. At the time of hearing before the Comission,
forty-six cities and towns imposed these levies, which, when
. related to local exchange revenue, ranged from .39 per cent
to 7.28 per cent. Thirty other cities, towns and villages im- posed municipal levies, but these were so low that when
related to the lowest priced telephone service within the
exchange would not produce a charge of one cent per
::: month; and in ninety-four cities, towns and communities,
-:..:no municipal levies were imposed.
In the past these municipal levies were reflected in the
bills of every exchange customer in the State entirely with.. out regard to whether or not the city or town in which that
:.:customer resided imposed any municipal levy. Thus the
~-customer in City A, which imposed no municipal levy, paid
the Company money to discharge in part the municipal levy
.:.-:of City B.
~

On this evidence the Commission reached the conclu·__sion that the practice of the Company of collecting from all
~-~-~its exchange customers in this State money with which to
~-... pay these municipal levies imposed by only certain cities
- 1nd towns, and with wide disparity of rate as between cer:> ;ain cities and towns, was an unjust and discriminatory
; ~ :lractice.
~~.~

. { Would a reasonably judging mind have necessarily
#;·eached a contrary decision? We think not.
~·,)

,JC;'

Testing the matter by another approach, suppose but

!~kne city in the State imposed a municipal levy and that this
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levy was five per cent of the Company's gross exchange
revenue within the city and no other city or town in the
State imposed any municipal levy and that the rates of the
Company were such that every exchange customer in the
State contributed money for the payment of this levy and
the Commission found that this practice was unjust and
discriminatory, could any reasonably judging mind say that
the Commission must have reached a contrary conclusion?
As we perceive the argument of the City in relation to
this question, it tacitly admits that there is at least prima
facie discrimination in the practice of the Company in recovering from its customers on a state-wide basis money
with which to pay municipal levies. But the City in effect
asserts that the discrimination cannot be abolished for the
reasons which it assigns.
It is first suggested that the Commission having prev~
iously approved state-wide rate schedules which included
money for the payment of municipal levies, the approval is
res judicata and cannot in this proceeding be disturbed. It
would seem manifest to us that if the Commission now finds
that a practice previously allowed is demonstrated to be.
unjust and discriminatory, it is not only the power but the
duty of the Commission to correct the abuse as quickly as

possible.
See:

Skinner & Eddy Corporation v. United States
et al., 249 U. S. 557.
Then the City in effect seeks to avoid the discrimina·
tion under consideration by developing the proposition that
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, there are elements of discrimination in the state-wide rate
schedules. The Company makes no contention that its basic
rate schedules are free from all discrimination. Basic telephone rates are now and for many years in the past have
been arranged on what is known as the state-wide theory
- of rate making. This system has been adopted by. the regulatory commissions in almost all States for promulgating
rates for telephone service. It has two basic concepts: First,
that the rate for service shall be graduated according to
the value of the service to the user ; and, second, that the
rates for telephone exchange service shall be graduated
according to the number of telephones in use in each ex- change, with the same rates applying in every exchange of
approximately the same size. For example, all exchanges
__::
having four hundred to eight hundred telephones would
have the same rates for the different classes of service. To
the extent that one exchange in this classification might
-· have just over four hundred telephones and another might
- have just under eight hundred telephones, it is, of course,
obvious that there is some reasonable discrimination under
::.-- this theory of rate making. Likewise it is reasonable to
.- expect that although the rate for telephone service is not
::-;: primarily based on the cost of service, nevertheless it may
very well cost the Telephone Company more to furnish
service to a user living five miles from the central office
than it would to one living five blocks from such office
_~( inasmuch as a pair of wires is nececssary to serve each
'· · single line and must run the entire distance from the central
office to the user's premises.
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The state-wide method of making telephone rates and
occasionally rates of other utilities has been approved by
all of the courts of last resort reviewing the question. Typical of these decisions are:

City of New York v. Feinberg et al., 109 N.Y. S.
2d 131, decided January 9, 1952;
People ex rel. P. U. C. v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., et al., 243 P. 2d 397, decided
February 6, 1952;
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Memphis
et al., 200 Fed. 657, at 660;
P. S. Gas Co. v. Board of PUC, 87 A. 651, at 654;
St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649,
at 665;
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 Fed. 2d 180
at 181, and cases cited therein;
Board of Supervisors of Arlington County v.
Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. C. & P. Co. of
Va., 45 S. E. 2d 145.
However, the City does not attack the state-wide theory
of rate making but contends that it objects to the departure therefrom with respect to franchise fees and taxes,
especially in the absence of any evidence to show any reasonable basis in fact for that departure from established
and approved practice.
The position of the Company in answer to the contentions of the City is this: There are concededly elements
of reasonable discrimination in state-wide rate making. It
is neither possible nor practical to remove all of these elements of discriminatio~. We have here under consideration

i
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a particular item of Company expense, namely, municipal
levies. The inclusion of money to pay these municipal levies
in state-wide rates is an unjust and discriminatory practice.
This is one practice which can be isolated, effectively dealt
with, and abolished by the proposal under consideration.
Manifestly, then, the injustice and discrimination which
can readily be reached should be removed at once and to
that extent the state-wide rate making practice bettered
and improved.
In its Point numbered 3 the City contends in effect that
the benefits of its franchise with the Company flow out to
-- the users of telephone service throughout the State and
that accordingly the Telephone customers state-wide should
provide the money with which to pay the municipal levy
of the City.
Consideration of this argument requires further ex-- amination of the taxing provisions of Ogden's franchise.
The measure was patently a revenue raising imposition.
It was expressly levied in lieu of all license, franchise, occupation and other similar taxes.
It was not pretended to be commensurate with any

benefit or protection which the Company might receive because it provided that
"The Company shall pay to the City of Ogden
upon the passage, approval and acceptance of this
ordinance, an amount equal to one per cent (1%)
of the local exchange revenues derived from telephones located within Ogden City limits."
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The amount of free service which the Company was
required to render was also graduated according to the population of the City.
The money which is derived from this revenue raising
measure goes into the general funds of the City and is expended by the City for such municipal purposes as it sees
fit.
The franchise features of these impositions are actually incidental and insignificant. This is illustrated by
the fact that for some twenty-two years the Company had
no franchise whatever in Salt Lake City but was taxed and
continued to pay Salt Lake City an imposition measured
by a percentage of its gross exchange revenue within the
City (R. 181).
Apart from the nature of the imposition involved is
the contention of the City sound on principal? We think
not. To illustrate, a telephone customer in Ogden calls
Tooele. The facilities of the Company in Tooele are as valuable to the Ogden customer as those in Ogden are to the
Tooele customer, yet Tooele imposes only a nominal tax
upon the Company, while the municipal levy of Ogden is
1.44 per cent. Thus while the benefits from the existence of
the Company's plant in Ogden flow out to other cities, so
also do the benefits from plants in other cities flow into
Ogden. One benefit serves to offset the other.
Viewing the foregoing aspects of the practice here under consideration and turning back again to the test which 1
must guide us in this case, could any reasonable mind come
to the same judgment that the Commission came to in this .
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case? We believe that the conclusion of the Commission is
not only that of a reasonably judging mind but the only
conclusion which could properly be reached on the record
_presented.
For the reason that every case of this kind must be
determined from an examination of the record presented,
decisions from other jurisdictions may be of little assistance, and the foregoing discussion should conclude the argument under defendant's Point I. We shall, however, consider certain decisions from other jurisdictions.
City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas & Electric Co. et al., 1 N. E. 2d 489 (Ill. 1936).

The gas company here served an area called its northern territory. The Illinois Commerce Commission made
an order approving a rate schedule in this northern territory of the company and, as a part thereof, authorized the
company to add to its uniform charges for gas service a
percentage differential sufficient to meet the annual payments collected by five cities, including Elmhurst, by virtue
of respective franchise ordinances. Similar taxes were not
exacted in other cities in the northern territory except the
five cities in question. The Elmhurst franchise ordinance
required a three per cent levy on gross receipts on business
done within its boundaries. Elmhurst complained to the
Commission about the three per cent additional allowance
on the rates. The Commission dismissed this complaint, and
the Jower court sustained.
The opinion reviews several Illinois statutes, most of
which are generally the same as those of Utah, concerning
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unreasonable rates and prohibiting discrimination. One section prohibited utilities from establishing rate differentials
as between localities and between classes of service and
customers. Whether precisely covered by similar Utah statutes or not, the Commission has always considered telephone rates on the same basis as required in Illinois. No
question was raised as to the basic rates, so the controversy
settled around the three per cent addition to cover the cost
of the franchise payment based on gross receipts. The court
at page 491 of the Northeastern Report says:
"It is argued that annual franchise payments
should not be charged against the patrons of the
appellant, and that the practical effect is to give
those who are nonusers of gas the benefit of the
franchise rate paid by gas users. Such is the effect.
It is seldom that the imposition of a tax or franchise
charge does not work a hardship on some individuals.
The human race has not yet reached that degree of
perfection whereby taxing systems have been evolved
which in their practical operation do not, on occasion,
work some degree of injustice to some individuals."

Elmhurst contended that the franchise payment was a
capital charge. The court dismissed this contention at page
491 of the Northeastern Report, saying:
"Franchise payments are properly chargeable.
as an element of the cost of operation which should
be borne by the consumers of the utility's product or
service (Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton (D. C.) 267
F. 231; Chicago Railways Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm. (D. C.) 277 F. 970; and the amortization of
the franchise expenses should be charged as an operating expense. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith
(D. C. 295 F. 385, 391). It would be unjust to spread
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the burden of this annual franchise payment over
the whole northern division. It should be borne by
the company's consumers residing within the city
as that city alone receives the advantage of such
annual payment. So, also, it is immaterial in what
form the pro rata share of the consumers' payment of
the annual payment be made to the city. There is
no statute in this state prescribing the method of
allocating such item and it may properly be written
on the consumer's statement as three per cent."
In conclusion, at page 492 of the Northeastern Report, the
court said:
"The order of the Commerce Commission does
not, as applied to the customers of the public utility
within the appellant city, create an unreasonable difference between localities and classes of service."
It will be readily apparent that the facts in the Elm-

hurst case are closely identical to those in the case at bar,
the only difference being a gas service rather than a telephone service was involved. It is apparent the gas com. - pany rates were arranged on somewhat the same basis as
the telephone rates in Utah, and certainly the direct ques-::: tion of discrimination in favor of the users within the city
limits of the city exacting a franchise, as compared to the
users elsewhere in the state, was directly raised. The decision appears to be so closely in point as to be sound author- ity for the Court to consider in disposing of the issues in
the instant matter.
State v. Department of Public Service, 142 P.
2d 498 (Wash. 1943).
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This case came to the Washington Supreme Court on
an appeal of numerous issues involved in a general rate
case. The Washington Commission (designated as "the
Department" in the opinion) entered an order that all occupational and franchise and similar municipal charges
might be passed on to the rate payer. Upon the record,
commencing at page 532 of the Pacific Report, the court
undertook to determine whether or not the Washington
Commission, under the law of that State, had authority to
issue this order. The municipal exactions in question consisted of occupation taxes and franchise taxes. The court
considered these taxes separately.
The occupation tax levies ranged from four per cent
in Seattle to one per cent in Olympia, Shelton and Dayton.
The cities contended that any discrimination against persons living outside the cities in question was so slight as to
be negligible. The court in answering this contention at
page 535 of the Pacific Report said :
"As above stated, the bases upon which excise
taxes have been levied by the cities vary greatly,
ranging from four per cent of the gross income to
one per cent. No one can say how far this variation
might be extended. It suggests large possibilities of
municipal action. Manifestly there is an element of
unjust discrimination in allowing one community to
levy and collect from respondent or any public utility engaged in business throughout the state an occupation tax which in turn the utility would collect
by a, state-wide increase in rates. If such taxes were
generally levied and varied little in the percentage of
gross revenue by which the tax is computed, the mat·
ter might well be unimportant; but the contrary is
the fact."

1
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The cities further contended that the order in question
was in violation of constitutional and statutory powers enjoyed by the cities. In answer to this contention, the court,
at the same page, said :

..:

__:...

"By Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 10391, the department
is vested with authority over rates to be charged by
public utilities. In the case of State ex rei. City of
Seattle v. Public Service' Commission, 103 Wash. 72,
173 P. 737, 739, this court held that the department
(then the commission) had the power 'to fix reasonable or sufficient rates at the request of the carrier
notwithstanding the franchise contract.' An order
of the commission approving a tariff filed by the
utility in disregard of a franchise provision providing for commutation tickets was upheld. It would
seem that the case cited is in some conflict with at
least one decision of this court, but it is not necessary to consider that matter here. In any event, the
department enjoys wide powers in exercising its
authority to fix rates."

The Washington court then undertakes to deal with
- · the matter of franchise taxes and reaches the conclusion
~: that the Department had no power to pass these impositions
~:~ along to local rate payers unless the Department found that
.: such taxes were excessive or out of proportion to the privi:~;: lege accorded to the utility. If the Department so found
~-:::- then it would have the power to fix the proper proportion
111
(
between general operating expense and the local rate payj~
,fl'; ers. We do not intend in the least to disparage the Supreme
~-~Court of Washington, but we are unable to follow the logic
rf~ of this proposition. Either the Department did or did not
f!P:/ have jurisdiction to deal with the problem. If it did not
~~~-
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have jurisdiction, then we would think it clear that it could
not break down a franchise tax payment and undertake to
determine how much of the same represented compensation
for a privilege accorded to a utility by the municipality and
how much was in excess of such compensation. If, however, the department did have jurisdiction, we would think
it clearly had power to deal with the entire problem. We
believe that the Washington court loses sight of the fundamental fact that the Department was not dealing with the
relationship between the company on the one hand and the
cities on the other, but rather with the relationship of the
company to its rate payers, which relationship involved
only the matter of rates, a subject entirely and peculiarly
within the jurisdiction of the Department. This fundamental fact was clearly recognized by the Illinois court in
its decision in the Elmhurst case, supra and has been recognized by the Courts of this State as will be demonstrated
in the consideration of defendant's Point III.
In State v. Department of Public Utilities, 207 P. 2d
712 (Wash. 1949) the Supreme Court of that State again
deals with the subject of the treatment of these municipal
levies and appears to hold that the Washington Commission had the power to pass on to rate payers a tax for the
privilege of using the streets. The decision does not disclose
what difference there may be between a tax imposed for
the use of streets and a franchise imposition exacted for
the same purpose. On principle we can perceive no difference.
Even if the Washington cases, attempting as they do
to draw a fine line of distinction between franchise taxes
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and other municipal levies, are correct on principle, we
believe that they are of no controlling importance here because the imposition of City by its express terms is
"in lieu of all license, franchise, occupation and other
similar taxes."
Here is an unequivocal expression that the tax in question
was intended to embrace all the other specified impositions.
In the following decisions by state public utilities commissions, the same general question as presented in the
case at bar was considered, namely, whether the recovery
of municipal levies oi all forms considered here, including
franchise payments, represents a discrimination in the utility's rate structure. In other words, the commissions were
concerned with whether an unjust and discriminatory practice resulted from the collection from rate payers in the
entire territory served of money necessary to discharge
these municipal levies. The decisions all indicate, after
finding such a method of recovery would be discrimi11-atory,
that the discriminatory practice could be cured if municipal
levies were recovered within the boundaries of the cities
enacting the various forms of municipal levies.
See:

Detroit Edison Company, 16 PUR NS 9, at 24
(Mich. 1936) ;
(

Re Consumers Power Co., 14 PUR NS 36, at 41
(Mich. 1936) ;
Re Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 7 PUR NS 21, at
33 (N. C. 1934) ;
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Re Idaho Power Company, PUR 1921C 238, at
242;
Swarthmore v. Philadelphia M. & S. S. R. Co.,
PUR 1921E 252, at 261 (Penn.) ;
Re Southern California Gas Co., PUR 1922A
277.
There is every reason to classify the franchise tax payment in the same category as other municipal licens~ and
occupation taxes of any nature whatsoever, at least to the
extent that the cost of the franchise payment from the
Company to the City is based upon the gross receipts received from exchange service within the city limits. The
other forms of municipal levy are likewise based upon the
same measure of tax. Conceivably, there might be some
ground for drawing a distinction if a company contracted
with a city for a franchise covering a period of years and
made one single payment at the time of entering into the
franchise to cover the entire franchise period. Under such
circumstances the company on the one hand would be making one single payment, the amount of which would be sub1
ject to negotiation between the parties and would be payable at the time the contract was entered into. Variatiot;IS,
1
in the gross receipts of the company from the customers
residing within the city limits of the municipality would
make no difference as to the entire cost over the life of
the contract. There might be and probably would be justifi- :
cation for capitalizing the single payment as a capital :
charge rather than an operating expense. On the other
hand, all these courts agree that the cost of these municipal '!.
1

1
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levies when based on gross receipts, whether for a franchise
payment or any other form of tax, is an operating expense.
If a differentiation is to be made between franchise
taxes and other forms of municipal exaction, so that money
to discharge franchise tax payments are collected from the
general rate payers over the State and the money with
which to pay other forms of levy from the customers resid. ing within the city limits of municipalities adopting other
: forms of tax, then obviously it would be to the advantage
. of a city considering such a tax to put it in the form of a
. franchise payment, thereby requiring the general body of
.. customers over the State to share in the cost of the tax.
If this Court is disposed to follow the Washington de~ cisions exclusively and rule that the Commission is author. :ized to approve a tariff permitting the municipal exactions
:·to be included in the rates of the customers within the city
- limits of those cities enacting such levies only if they are
·-not franchise taxes, then, in the opinion of the defendant
-~Company, the Court, as a matter of law, or the Commission
- .3.s a matter of administrative regulation may as well dis-~lpprove the tariff in its entirety. The very object of the
~ · :ariff is to avoid what the Company considers and the Com·>nission found to be an unjust and discriminatory practice.
>-:ro draw a fine distinction between franchise payments and
:-:::~ther forms of municipal levies, all of which are based on
~_~ross receipts, would leave just as serious a situation with
~; espect to discriminatory practice as now exists.

fJ~j

State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Service Com:-ft:,ission, 245 S. W. 2d 851 (Mo. 1952), is a case involving

!
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a private water company serving sixty-six incorporate(
and numerous unincorporated areas in St. Louis County
Five separate rates were provided for different classes oJ
customers, but the same rate for each class applied in thE
entire territory, regardless of the size of the city or othe1
considerations. Previously the company's property had been
valued and its rates fixed on a system-wide basis. Sixteen
of the sixty-six incorporated areas levied special taxes on
the gross receipts of the company within the area of the separate municipalities. Levies ranged from two to five per
cent of the gross receipts. There, as in the case at bar, the
company contended that the practice of recovering money
with which to pay these levies from its customers on a system-wide basis was discriminatory, and the company proposed to the commission to correct these inequities between
the customers. Tariffs were filed by the company to cover
the change in rates in order to take care of these municipal levies, but otherwise to make no change in the basic
rate schedule.
One basic difference in the facts, however, develops
from the disclosure that the water company proposed to
pass on franchise taxes only where they exceeded two per
cent; that is, if the city collected a five per cent franchise
tax, only three per cent would be included in the rate for
water service to the customer. The reason for eliminating
the first two per cent from consideration is not apparent.
Upon hearing, the commission found the practice in
question to be discriminatory in that the consumers in one
area were burdened with a part of the taxes levied or pay-
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ments exacted in another area and that the consumers in
municipalities seeking to obtain revenue from such taxes
should bear the burden of providing the revenue with which
to pay the tax. The commission's order made no differentiation between the form of tax and considered franchise
taxes along with license taxes, occupation taxes, street
rentals and kindred levies in other forms. The commission
further found the cost should be included in the rate for
water service by adding to each individual customer's bill
a separate item. This latter finding is in accord with the
Commission's finding in the case at bar.
Upon review the intermediate court sustained the commission's order. The Supreme Court reviewed to determine
·whether the commission's order was reasonable and lawful
or, conversely, arbitrary and without reasonable basis, concluding that upon the record there was no reasonable basis
for the commission's order. The judgment of the circuit
:court was reversed.
In the Missouri case no showing was made or evidence
:presented to show what change would be made in the com: pany's rate of .return if money to pay these taxes were re:.covered locally, and the Missouri court appears to have
:·taken the position that in the absence of any showing of
;the extent of benefit to the company from the proposed
._change in rate practice it should not approve the tariff. In
:the case at bar, however, the Company showed affirmatively
_the earnings benefit which it would receive ( .21 per cent or
i from 5.26 per cent to 5.47 per cent) and that the rate of
~return with this improvement in earnings would be less
fthan that previously authorized by the Commission.
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The Missouri court also takes the position that inasmuch as the largest part of the gross revenues received for
water service rendered came from the largest municipalities, and inasmuch as, for the most part, the largest municipalities were the ones enacting the tax levies, the discrimination resulting from these municipal levies would tend
to be cured. The opinion suggests, although there was no
evidence on the subject, that it undoubtedly cost less to
furnish the water service in the larger municipalities, and
therefore the profit should be greater in such cities because the water company charged the same rate for metered
and unmetered water service, regardless of the size of the
town and regardless of the distance from the reservoirs or
the length of the distribution lines. Telephone rates, on
the other hand, vary as between classes of service, that is,
there is more than one rate for business service and there
are several classes of residence service in each exchange.
Furthermore, the lowest rates for each of the classes of
service apply in the smallest towns and they are graduated
upward by groups, depending _on the number of ·customers
in the exchange. These practices contribut~ substantially
toward the elimination of any discrimination between users
in large and small communities.
There is, moreover, a basic difference between telephone rates and water rates. The latter rates are measured
by a unit of consumption, such as a gallon. Telephone rates
are based on value. This value depends upon how many
telephones each customer is able to reach, both within the
area of the exchange and elsewhere. It is for this reason
that telephone rates not only vary as between classes of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
service in each exchange, but also vary as between exchanges, depending upon the number of customers in the
exchange. A water user, however, is concerned only with
the water drawn through his connection or meter. Apart
from the possibility of pressure, he is not concerned with
how many or how few other water customers are served
or where they may be located.
~

The Missouri court assumes, upon the grounds above
suggested, that, apart from the question of municipal levies,
there was discrimination in the flat system-wide rates of
the water company, and holds that until such other discrimination was isolated and determined the discrimination aris-'
ing from the municipal levies should not be removed. It
is noted that the Missouri court thus proceeds at the outset
upon a pure assumption not supported by any evidence. In
the case of the telephone rates, however, this same assumption may not fairly be made. Moreover,. as the witness
Sawyer pointed out, the figures to develop the cost of telephone service between various communities were not and
never have been available (R. 134-35) . If the courts are
to insist that the matter of possible discrimination as between u~ers in different communities be refined down to
absolute costs, then it would be extremely difficult for the
Company to do so. This same difficulty .might not be ex' perienced with a water company, because its rates being
;- based upon a unit of consumption, costs might be reduced
- to that unit. It is difficult for us to believe that the una vail~ ability of such cost figures of the Company should afford
. a reasonable excuse for not now eliminating such an ob" vious discrimination as is produced by failure to recover
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locally money to discharge the municipal levies here involved.
We in no manner concede that there is anything unreasonable in the conclusion reached by the Commission in
the case at bar, admitting however for the purposes of
argument that different courts or different commissions
might reasonably reach different results in weighing and
considering the evidence presented in such a case, then in
this very difference of result so reached is found a fundamental reason why the Missouri case is not decisive or
controlling here. The reason lies in the differences in scope
of review permitted under the Missouri and Utah statutes.
Under the Missouri statutes, decisions of its public service commission are first subject to review by the circuit
courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court.
The controlling statute on review by the circuit court
appears to be Section 386.510, Missouri Revised Statutes,
1949, which provides that
"Within thirty days after the application for a
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted,
then within thirty days after the rendition of the
decision on rehearing, the applicant may apply to
the circuit court of the county where the hearing
was held or in which the commission has its principal office for a writ of certiorari or review (herein
referred to as a writ of review) for the purpose of
having the reasonableness or lawfulness of the original order or decision or the order or decision on
rehearing inquired into or determined. * * * No
new or additional evidence may be introduced upon
the hearing in the circuit court but the cause shall
be heard by the court without the intervention of a
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jury on the evidence and exihibits introduced before
the commission and certified to by it. The commission and each party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear
in the review proceedings. Upon such hearing the
circuit court shall enter judgment either affirming
or setting aside the order of the commission under
review. In case said order is reversed by reason of
the commission's failing to receive testimony properly proffered, the court shall remand the cause to
the commission, with instructions to receive the testimony so proffered and rejected, and enter a new
order based upon the evidence theretofore taken, and
such as it is directed to receive. The court may, in
its discretion, remand any case which is reversed by
it to the commission for further action. No court in
this state, except the circuit courts to the extent
herein specified and the Supreme Court or the various courts of appeals on appeal, shall have jurisdiction to review, correct or annul any order or decision
of the commission or to suspend or delay the executing or operation thereof, or, to enjoin, restrain
or interfere with the commission in the performance
of official duties. The circuit courts of this state
shall always be deemed open for the trial of suits
brought to review the orders and decisions of the
commission as provided in the public service commission law and the same shall be tried and determined as suits in equity."
The jurisdiction of the Missouri Supreme Court is
derivative, and on an appeal to that Court the question is
whether the order or decision is reasonable and lawful or,
t
~:·conversely, whether it is arbitrary and without reasonable

: basis.
~

~

~
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A careful reading of the Missouri decisions discloses
that the Supreme Court exercises the power to weigh the
evidence.
See:

State v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,
47 s. w. 2d 102;
State v. Public Service Commission, 252 S. W.
446.
Thus the power of the Missouri court is much like that
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, considered by this
Court in Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of Utah, supra, where it was shown that the
New Mexico statute provided for a review by the Supreme
Court of the reasonableness and lawfulness of an order
made by the State Corporation Commission upon the evidence adduced before the Commission and that the Supreme
Court upon the evidence determined the reasonableness and
lawfulness of the order made by the Commission: Thus
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, like that
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, operates directly on
the evidence and not on the decision of the commission.
This the Utah courts may not do under the provisions of
said Section 76-6-16, supra, as was clearly pointed out by
the Court in Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public' Utilr
ities Commission of Utah, supra (St. John case).
The inquiry in this State must be not whether the decision of the Commission is reasonable and lawful, but
whether any reasonably judging mind could have reached

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
the same decision as the Commission reached. Tested in the
light of that inquiry the order and decision of the Commission should be sustained.

II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CITY'S CONTENTION THAT MONEYS TO
DISCHARGE ITS MUNICIPAL LEVY SHOULD
BE PAID BY THE STATE-WIDE CUSTOMERS
OF THE COMPANY.
The Company under this Point will deal with the City's
argument under its Point 4. However, inasmuch as questions of law will be considered under subsequent Points,
we will deal here only with the evidence.
The City contends that the evidence shows that the
Company must derive .the revenue with which to pay the
exactions imposed by the municipal levy of 1941 from its
rate payers on a state-wide basis.
The evidence on this subject is oral and documentary.
It consists of the testimony of the witness Sawyer and the

franchise ordinance and the free service agreement (R.
21-22-Exhibits 3 and 4).
Considering first the exhibits : An examination of the
franchise ordinance shows that it is in part, as the testimony of the witness Sawyer indicated (R. 182), a working
agreement between the Company and the City. Thus the
City, in Section 1, grants to the Company certain privileges
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with respect to the poles and wires of the Company, and
the Company, in Section 3, grants certain privileges to the
City with respect to its wires. In Section 4, however, we
find the taxing provisions whereby the City, in lieu of all
.license, franchise, occupation and other similar taxes, imposes the levy upon the Company.
We have carefully searched this instrument for
any language to indicate any expression of intent with respect to the source of the Company's revenue with which to
pay the tax. None has been found.
There is nothing in the free service agreement which
in any way suggests how the cost of providing that service
would be recovered by the Company.
Turning to the testimony of Sawyer, Mr. Thatcher, in
cross-examination, suggests to the witness that the real parties in interest in the franchise negotiations of 1941 were
the inhabitants of Ogden; and Mr. Sawyer replies, "I would
say that is correct." No further evidence on this subject
appears in the record.
Putting to one side at this time the consideration of
any questions of law, the simple fact is that we have here
purely a relationship between the City and the Company
under which a tax was imposed upon the Company and it
agreed to provide certain free service. There is not one
scintilla of evidence that the parties ever agreed upon or
even considered how the Company would raise the money
to discharge these levies.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
III.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION AND VALID. IT
NEITHER IMPAIRS ANY FRANCHISE OBLIGATION OF THE COMBANY TO THE CITY
NOR IN ANY MANNER RELEASES OR EXTINGUISHES ANY INDEBTEDNESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY TO
THE CITY.
Defendant will here deal with the City's Points 5, 6
and 7, in which it is contended that the order under review
impairs the City's contract and releases and extinguishes
the obligation of the Company to the City and is beyond
the power of the Commission and void.
A simple way to test the validity of this argument is,
we believe, to consider the relationship of the City and the
Company before and after the order.

f

:1

'
i!

As observed at the outset of this brief, this case touches
two relationships, one between the Company and the City,
the other between the Company and its rate payers. The
latter relationship is affected by the order; the former is
not. Before the order in question, the Company was obligated to pay the City certain taxes and to render certain
services. This duty remains completely unimpaired, for the
City will receive precisely the same money and service, at
the same time, at the same rate, and from the same taxpayer
as before.
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The City contends that the real parties in interest in
the franchise negotiation of 1941 were the inhabitants of
the City. Conceding this to be so, the inhabitants of the
City are not the- same body of persons as the Company's
rate payers. The City may, in certain matters, act for its
.. inhabitants, but the Commission controls the relationship
between the Company and its customers, particularly with
respect to rates and charges. That relationship alone has
been changed for, by the order of the Commission, a rate
practice previously employed will be removed and another
rate practice prescribed.
The Commission is here dealing with the matter of
rates and charges. The general jurisdiction of the Commission over this subject is found in Section 76-4-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, and express jurisdiction is found in >~.
Section 76-4-4, of the same code.
~
The City, however, invokes the obligations of contract
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. and the
provisions of Article I, Section 18, Article VI, Sections 27
and 29, and Article VII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution
as imposing a restraint upon the power of the Commission.
The position of ·the City in its most favorable light may
be stated thus: In 1941 a franchise was granted by the
City to the Company pursuant to which the Company agreed
to pay certain moneys to the City. In granting this franchise the City represented its inhabitants and the money
which the Company was obligated to pay to the City was
for the benefit of such inhabitants. The levy of 1941 would,
however, be collected state-wide by the Company. Now the

1

~
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Company proposes to collect the levy money from a body
of Ogden inhabitants alone, thereby, as the City contends,
increasing the rates which this body of inhabitants must
pay and rendering the franchise levy of 1941 less valuable
and beneficial to the inhabitants of the City.
Substantially the same contentions as here made by the
City have in a series of cases before this Court been made
by municipalities and other parties and in each case denied.
We believe it unnecessary to consider these cases in detail.

In Salt Lake City et al. v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556, which was one of the earliest
and most carefully considered cases on this subject, the
Court in dealing with the contract provisions of the State
and Federal Constitutions and the proyisions of Article
XII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution and holding the
same not to be violated by the order of the Commission, at
pages 217 and 218 of the Utah Report pointed out that

"* * * This objection has often been made
in cases where either the city or the street car company has sought relief from a rate fixed by franchise
ordinances like those in question here. It should be
observed, however, that where the controversy has
arisen between the contracting parties merely, and
in ordinary actions or proceedings, the courts have
usually compelled compliance with the provisions of
the franchise ordinances treating them as contracts.
Where, however, as here, the application was made
to Utilities Commissions in pursuance of a legislative act, the courts have, with few exceptions, held
that a constitutional or statutory provision prohibit~
ing the Legislature from passing laws authorizing
the construction and operation of street railways in
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cities without the consent of the local authorities
does not authorize such authorities to fix rates which
may not be changed by the Legislature or by a utilities commission created for that purpose. In other
words, it is universally held that the regulation and
fixing of rates is a governmental function, that is, a
legislative function, which will not be deemed to have
been surrendered by the sovereign state unless it
has been done in clear and unequivocal terms."
In City of St. George v. Public Utilities Commission
et al., 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720, the provisions of Article
VI, Sections 27 and 29, were relied upon. In meeting this
contention the Court at page 464 of the Utah Report says:
"We can see nothing in either of these sections
which prevents the state from enforcing its governmental functions to regulate rates for public utility
service. Section 27 clearly refers to obligations which
arise out of contracts other than those pertaining
to public utility service. It has so often been held
that it would be useless to cite the numerous authorities that, unless the sovereign has in express terms
or by unavoidable implication surrendered its governmental function to regulate rates for public utility
service, such surrender will be held not to exist."
In Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction Co. et al., 56
Utah 437, 191 Pac. 421, the Court, at page 439 of the Utah
Report said :

~

.

~

~

"* * * It is not questioned that the city
authorities have and had the right to grant to the
defendants or their predecessors the privilege to
operate a street railway upon the streets of such
city. Neither is it questioned that the right exists
to prescribe conditions or limitations under which
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such privilege may be exercised. The power, however, to fix the fare to be received by the utility, or
the defendants in this action is retained by the state
and can be exercised by it whenever the necessity
requires action upon its part."
Again, in United States Smelting, Refining & M. Co.
v. Utah Pozcer & Light Co. et al., 58 Utah 168, 197 Pac. 902,
the contract provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions were invoked. The Court, in answering these contentions, at page 182 said:
"It has been held repeatedly, both by the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of
last resort of many of the states, including this court,
that the regulation of rates for public utilities is a
governmental function coming directly within the
police power of the state, and that for that reason
the establishing or modifying of rates, although contractual, does not violate the constitutional provision
aforesaid."

Each of the foregoing Utah cases involves a direct interference with a rate fixed by contract or franchise, while
in the case at bar, even conceding for argument the City's
contention, the Commission's order has only an indirect
and remote effect upon the franchise granted to the Company by the City.
Furthermore, the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of the obligations of contract does not prohibit
a State's reducing the obligation some contracting party
owes to it but rather prohibits a State's impairing the obligation which it owes to others. If it is to be assumed in the
instant case that the State, by the action of the Commission
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in approving the proposed tariff is reducing or impairing
an obligation, it is only reducing or impairing the obliga.
tion which a third party owes to one of its instrumentalities,
namely, the municipality of Ogden; and this situation is
identical with the one which would exist if the State were
reducing the obligation of the third party to the State itself.
See:

City of New Orleans v. New Orleans WateT
Works Co., 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. Ed 943;
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 169, 52 L. Ed.
151;
W or chester v. Wore hester Consolidated Street
R. Co., 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. Ed. 591;
City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co.
et al., 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. Ed. 1054;
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 67 L. Ed.
937.
The City in effect concedes this rule of law but seeks
to avoid its application upon two grounds. It first advances
the theory that although the City may be bound by the
application of the rule, its inhabitants are not and cites
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856.
This case holds that a court will, under certain circumstances, pierce the corporate veil, particularly where a corporation is utilized as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience, to justify wrong, or to perpetrate fraud. We are
unable to perceive how that decision is in point here. In
any event, the facts in support of such a contention were
very much stronger in the case of Salt Lake City et al. v.

I

,,!
1
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Utah Light & Traction Co., supra, for in that case the franchise ordinance provided for the issuance of so-called commutation tickets, which permitted transportation at a reduced rate, which rate was changed and raised by the order
of the Commission. It was contended that many persons
built homes in the suburbs of Salt Lake City and along the
street railway outside of Salt Lake City, relying upon the
benefit of the cheaper transportation under these commutation tickets, and that the Commission had no power to
deprive inhabitants of the benefit accruing from this provision of the franchise. This Court answered such contention at pages 224 and 225 of the Utah Report, saying in
part:

--'

"It is, however, further contended that, because
the franchise ordinances -provided for the so-called
commutation tickets and in reliance on them many
persons have built homes in the suburbs of Salt Lake
City and along defendant's line of street railway outside of Salt Lake City, for that reason the defendant
should be held to be estopped fr.om increasing the
rates of fare without the consent of those persons.
It needs no argument to show that the elements of
estoppel are lacking in this case. A conclusive answer to the contention, however, is that any one who
purchased commutation tickets and who built a home
did so subject to the right of the state to change or
alter the fares fixed in the franchise ordinances in
case it was found that such fares were unfair or
unreasonable."

~f:};

The second contention of the City is that in 1951 it
~--adopted the "Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City,"
;../
. pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, Section 5, of the
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Utah Constitution, and thereby enjoys constitutional protection which it might not otherwise have. The ready and
conclusive answer to this argument is found in the section
itself, which provides in part that

"* * * this grant of authority shall not include the power to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is provided for by general law, nor be deemed
to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in
matters relating to state affairs, to enact general
laws applicable alike to all cities of the State."
The general law for the regulation of utilities in this State
is found in said Title 76, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and
in the provisions of Sections 76-4-1 and 76-4-4 of that
title as relates to the case at bar.
It appears that contentions substantially the same as

here made by the City were urged by Elmhurst in the case
of City of Elmhurst v. Western Gas Co., supra. In disposing of such contentions, at page 492 of the Northeastern
Report, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

1

"There is no interference with the contract created by the original franchise and acceptance thereof
by the predecessor of the appellee, and the order of
the commission in nowise contravenes the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts."
The contentions of the City under its Points numbered
5, 6 and 7 are therefore without merit.
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IV.
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION FIXES
RATES; IT IMPOSES NO TAX OF ANY KIND
ON THE TELEPHONE CUSTOMER.
Under this Point, defendant will deal with the argument advanced by the City in its Point 8, wherein the City
contends that the order of the Commission in effect unlawfully transforms a franchise fee exacted from the Company
into a purchase, sales or use tax on the users of telephone
service.
The determination of the question here raised requires
· consideration again of the essential nature of the Company's
proposal and the Commission's order.
:-

-

"

The City seems unwilling to face these simple, inexorable facts: The Company is obligated to pay the municipal
levy to the City. Nothing in the order of the Commission
has in any manner released the Company from that duty
or impaired the measure of the obligation. Neither in substance nor form will that duty be changed. The Company
fully intends to pay this imposition and the accounting practice before and after the order will be the same. This is
made abundantly clear by the testimony of the witness
Sawyer (R. 161-62).

The only source of company revenue for the payment
of taxes is from its customers. Regardless of how this
::; burden may be apportioned or distributed, it will fall upon
the user of telephone service. The charges which the Com..
pany may make to its telephone customers and the revenue
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which the Company receives must and may only be reflected
in rates filed with and approved by the Commission. Although the money which the Company would collect from
the inhabitants of Ogden would put the Company in funds
with which to pay taxes to the City, it is not taxes which
the Company receives from the customer but revenue for
service, which must be treated by the Company in its accounting like any other revenue which it receives. Of this
there was no doubt, either in the mind of the Commission
or of the Company. The following questioning of Mr. Sawyer by Mr. Thain (R. 161) makes this clear:
"Q. In other words, all of the tax which you
will bill will in effect become a revenue? That is,
it will be credited to the revenue account of the Company?

''A.

Yes."

The decision of the Commission is equally clear through
the use of the following language (R. 33):
"The tariff affects only the source of revenue
for the discharge of these taxes. This involves directly the matter of rates. Ogden City has jurisdiction over its municipal franchise. This Commission
has jurisdiction over the rates of Mou.ntain States."

4

The City appears never to have perceived this point. Its
failure to do so is demonstrated in the cross-examination
of Mr. Sawyer by Mr. Thatcher in connection with the
billing to governmental agencies (R. 141-42), where Mr.
Sawyer endeavors to make clear to Mr. Thatcher the exact
nature of the relationship between the Company and its
customers as follows :
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"Q. In your investigations have you considered
whether or not if you bill it as a separate tax as approved or as proposed that will have to be eliminated
for all bills for telephone service to the Federal Government?

"A. No, it won't be. This is a fluctuation of
our rate structure in these towns to take care of this
expense, and as such the Government-all government accounts will be subject to this charge, they
will not be exempt from it. This is a rate-this is a
rate to take care of a tax expense on the Telephone
Company and will be adjusted in our rate schedules
in these towns in the amounts indicated here, so
that the Federal Government would be subject to
the same rates as any other customers, so far as this
is concerned."
Had the City perceived that rates and revenue are involved in the relationship between the customer and the
Company, it would have understood readily that the Government, like any ·other customer, must pay a published
rate.
Once these propositions are fully understood, the an. swer to the contentions of the City under this Point become
: obvious. There has been no transfer of tax from the Com:: pany to the telephone customer. The relation between 'the
:Company and the customer, strictly and accurately speak:; ing, does not involve tax. That relationship involves rates
/and revenue, and the money which the Company would
_,.collect from the inhabitants of the City would be taken into
~;and only into the revenue accounts of the Company. With
:; that revenue the Company would be enabled to meet its
municipal levy to Ogden. But the treatment of this revenue
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in the accounting of the Company would be no different
than the treatment of any other revenue which it might
receive.
It is clear that the Commission cannot engage in the
field of taxation. It is equally clear, however, that in the

regulation of rates, the Commission may enable the Company to obtain revenue to pay taxes which are levied upon
it. If the proposed tariff is finally disapproved, then in all
future rate adjustments of the Company revenues from
basic state-wide rates must be provided sufficient in amount
to enable the Company to pay these municipal levies. Thus,
under any concept, the recovery of money to pay these
muniCipal levies is a rate matter for consideration of the
Commission.
It appears that the Supreme Court of Washington in
State v. Department of Public Service, supra, was met with
the same argument as now advanced by the City, and in
disposing of it, at page 535 of the Pacific Reporter, said:

"There is no basis for the argument advanced
by the cities to the effect that the department is
seeking to exercise the taxing power, or to interfere
with the exercise of that power by the cities. The
only question concerns the allocation of the moneys
paid by respondent to the cities under a taxing or·
dinance or pursuant to franchise provisions, whether
these payments will be included in respondent's gen·
eral operating expenses or segregated and passed to ,
the rate payers in the respective municipal corpora·
tions to which the moneys are paid."
I
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CONCLUSION
The evidence supports the order of the Commission.
The order is within the jurisdiction of the Commission over
rates, charges and practices of the Company. It contravenes no constitutional prohibition. It is reasonable and
valid and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORNWALL,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company.
AKOLT, CAMPBELL, TURNQUIST
&SHEPHERD,
Of Counsel.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

